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Security on the Changing US Family Composition 
Adam Michael Gray 
From dual-earner, married couples, to opposite and same-sex cohabitation, America's family 
structure, lifestyles, and attitudes have been changing in recent years. This paper provides a 
framework of understanding how families interact and make economic decisions. It examines 
whether external and internal benefits to family formation exist. The governnlent should develop 
policies are both equitable and efficient depending on what benefits exist for society, if any. 
Currently, one of the biggest gains married partners make occurs within the Federal Income Tax 
and Social Security Systems. However, this structure was created at a time when families were 
very traditional-a working husband and childrearing, non-working wife. This structure will be 
simulated to show how America's changing family structures are being affected by this 
obsolescent model. Results provide evidence that nlore and more families are becoming 
economically disadvantaged because they do not get the same tax incentives and benefits that 
married, traditional families do. 
Economics Department 
Advisor: Professor R. Leekley 
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I. Introduction 
Recent news has focused on promoting traditional lifestyles and banning or discouraging 
all others. However, an overview of society shows that the proportion of traditional families is 
declining. Traditional families are those consisting of one man and one woman living together 
with the possibility of children, either biological or adopted. Non-traditional families include 
divorced families, single-parent families, opposite-sex partners, and same-sex partners. The US 
government legally recognizes one type of family: opposite-sex, married partners. This 
recognition provides tax breaks, insurance benefits, and life and death decision making for the 
spouse and children. If this is the case, what are the economic consequences for being outside of 
this traditional definition of family? 
This research studies the effects that the current Federal Tax structure and Social Security 
structure have on varying types of families in the US. This research examines the theories of 
both family and tax formation. The theory ofthe family is important in analyzing family 
formation and its economic benefits. Finally, the research discusses the theory of taxation with 
respect to the current tax structure in the US. It will become evident that the current structure is 
inequitable as well as inefficient. Currently, the US follows a non-marriage-neutral policy, 
moreover, developing policies that benefit the traditional family. This stance leads to economic 
inefficiencies and discrimination. Therefore, this research argues that marriage-neutrality is 
preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds. 
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II. Changing Nature of the Family - Empirical Evidence 
I
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The chart above shows household structural changes from 1970 to 2000. The two groups 
represented are non-family households and family households. Family households include 
married couples with or without children and singles (whether divorced or not) who are raising 
children or live in some other type of family arrangement. Non-family households include single 
men and women as well as other households that do not fit the typical "traditional family" 
definition, such as opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants. 
As seen in the chart, the composition of households and families along with marital status 
and living arrangements has changed significantly since the 1970s. Married couples with and 
without children have declined from 70% of total households to less than 53%. The number of 
marriages in the US shows annual growth of 0.7%. This increase, however, has been far slower 
than that of other types of family structures, which average 3% annual growth (CPR, 2001). 
Thus, in relative terms, non-family households, including singles and opposite-sex and same-sex 
cohabitants, have slowly increased, now representing almost half of total households. 
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; Therefore, this notion of "traditional family" is becoming obsolescent. Instead of the 
typical working male, house-making female, and children, we have more singles, divorcees, 
opposite-sex families, and same-sex families. These changes have several economic 
implications including family formation and tax consequences. 
III. The Economic Gains from Family Formation 
Why do families form at all? Of course, one reason is love. However, it is impossible to 
measure one's love for another precisely; therefore, the focus will return to economics. 
According to neoclassical analysis of the family, "adult members make informed and rational 
decisions that result in maximizing the utility or well-being of the family" (Francine Blau, 
Marianne Ferber, Anne Winkler, 2006). With these assumptions, economists are able to model 
family formation as well as other human behaviors including divorce, children's outcomes, and 
increases in female labor participation rates. 
Since the family is the economic unit in the US, the government must see its importance, 
thereby promoting bonds of traditional marriage and family through policies that protect and 
benefit the family. However, in order to decide whether the government should intervene to 
encourage families, traditional or otherwise, it must consider if the net benefits from family 
formation are largely internal to the family, or whether there are important positive externalities 
for society as a whole. 
If there are important external benefits to family formation, then subsidies to families­
such as more favorable tax treatment-may be justified on both equity and efficiency grounds. 
In addition, if these external benefits accrue to non-traditional families as well as traditional 
ones, then non-traditional families should receive these same subsidies. Conversely, if the 
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benefits are fundamentally internal to the family, then to be equitable and efficient, the 
government should not intervene, thereby taking a neutral stance toward family formation. 
A. Specialization according to comparative advantage (Division of Labor) 
According to Gary Becker's theory of the family, given scarce resources, people 
optimize, trying to gain more than they lose. Therefore, couples must see benefits by grouping 
their resources and specializing in household or labor force production. 
Division of labor is an important reason for family formation. Muller claims, "The 
family facilitates specialization and enables the spouses to exploit comparative advantages [... J 
(2002)." Traditionally, women have had a comparative advantage in housework, while their 
male counterparts are more effective in the workplace. Together they add to total production and 
combined, maximize their utility (Blau et. aI., 2006). Ifleft apart, neither would function 
efficiently (Eskridge, 1996). Through this division of labor and exploitation of comparative 
advantages, the two combine shared resources, thereby reducing their economic cost. 
Does division of labor differ across types of families? Can same-sex couples and non­
married, opposite-sex couples enjoy this benefit? According to Becker, the inherent biological 
differences make women more suitable for homemaking and childrearing while men are more 
suitable for the labor force. However, since the 1970s, the labor force has included a growing 
proportion of dual-earning couples. Dual-earners are those in which both husband and wife 
participate in paid labor. Beginning in 1976, dual-earners emerged as the predominant structure 
among married couples rising from 50 to 60% of all such families (Blau et. aI., 2006). Borjas 
has found that female labor force participation went from 42.8% in 1960 to over 74% in 1991 
among women aged 25 to 54 (2000). Moreover, as a woman ages, she is more likely to enter the 
work force. 
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Economically, women have entered the work force for many reasons. First, their wage 
rate has increased, therefore, providing incentive to allocate less time to household production 
and more time to paid labor. Second, fertility rates among women have fallen. From 1950 to 
1989, lifetime fertility rates of adult women fell from 3.3 to 2.0 children (Borjas, 2000). This 
decrease in fertility could be from any number of reasons: birth control, abortion, government 
transfer programs, or even the increased cost of raising children. Thirdly, technological 
advances in the home have likely led to more workers in the labor force. In the past 30 years, we 
have seen great advancements in technology. A few of these include improved stoves, washers, 
dryers, microwaves, and many other time saving devices. Borjas claims that these technological 
advances have led to a decrease in the marginal product ofhousehold production lessening the 
need for specialization and exchange (2000). 
Apparently, then, the comparative advantages that result from biological differences 
between men and women have declined (Muller, 2002). Since the cost ofhousehold production 
has decreased and both men and women can be very productive in the labor force, couples are 
seeing gains by both working and being dual-earners. This additional money allows these 
couples to experience higher standards of living. 
Muller's research claims that, "Even without full specialization [marriage] can exploit the 
full gains from the division oflabor without giving up efficiency (2002)". This challenges the 
appropriateness of Becker's economic model explaining division oflabor. The man does not 
have to work while the woman stays at home to realize gains from specialization. With women's 
increased labor participation rates, it is no longer the case that both partners completely differ in 
their production abilities or human capital. Partners will specialize in the production activity for 
Gray 6 
which they have the most human capital. Since this is not complete specialization, each split 
their production to some extent in both the home and in paid labor. 
This new model provides a better explanation ofhow division oflabor for dual-earner 
couples works. Since this model does not reflect biologically determined gender roles, it 
provides a rationalization why homosexual unions can gain from specialization (Muller, 2002). 
Finally, do these benefits accrue internally or externally? Since the only people who 
realize the benefit of living together and dividing their time between household and labor activity 
are the individuals of that couple, the benefits are largely internal. Therefore, this conclusion 
suggests that the government should take a marriage neutral position since society, as a whole, 
does not necessarily receive any benefit from the traditional family. 
B. Economies of Scale 
By conjoining, couples also experience economies of scale in allocating income within 
the household. This experience exists to the extent that with the increase of inputs, or people, 
there is less than a proportionate increase in cost (Eskridge, 1996). For example, it is cheaper to 
live together in one house than to own two separate houses. Grocery buying has a fixed cost for 
one person, but a lower marginal cost as additional people are added. A vacation for two is 
proportionally less expensive than a vacation for one since you can share travel (ifby car), room, 
and food. When couples share goods such as entertainment, food, housing, utilities, information, 
and even children, the costs are lower. 
Obviously, any grouping ofpeople can realize this benefit, regardless of whether it is a 
married couple, opposite-sex couple, same-sex couple, or just friends. Therefore, this benefit 
does not differ with type of family. Two can live nearly as cheaply as one by pooling and 
sharing resources. Furthermore, these benefits accrue internally. Only the people who take part 
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reap the benefit, no one else-therefore, again, implying the government should take a marriage­
neutral stance. 
C. Family-Specific Investments and Risk Pooling 
Besides division of labor and economies of scale, there are of course many more 
advantages to forming families. There are many marriage-specific investments made through 
marriage. Various skills and knowledge develop as family members learn from and about each 
other. Examples include cooking, cleaning, hobbies (like rock-climbing, bird watching, or 
reading), and even childrearing. Many of these would not occur without the other individual in 
one's life. In addition, couples can pool their risk. Ifboth spouses work, they have the added 
benefit of relying on the other one's income in case one must leave the work force. Arguably, 
couples face many possibilities ifboth spouses work. There is more stability to allow for major 
career changes, pursue additional education, or receive job training (Blau et. aI., 2006). 
Family groupings in any sense are important because they provide financially and 
economically stable households, especially for those in which a partner does not work. On the 
other hand, ifboth partners work, they have additional security in case one should lose his or her 
job. This pooling of risk also provides a social relationship that has many positive effects, 
especially emotionally. In addition, these units can create protective, stable environments for 
children and their education (Weisberg, 1975). Further, Folbre describes the family as the 
"primary site for the care, training, and maintenance ofpeople-the day-to-day as well as long 
run reproduction ofthe labor force" (Badgett, 2001). Therefore, couples who invest in each 
other gain both emotional and economic stability. 
Like economies of scale, any grouping of people can benefit from these "marriage" 
specific benefits and risk pooling. By living together, people can learn from each other and take 
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care of each other during hard times. Again, these benefits are largely internal. No one benefits 
from two people who pool their risk except those two people. For instance, if one spouse loses 
his or her job and mustshare the income of the other, the only one receiving that benefit is the 
partner who faces downsizing. In addition, the investments made with each other only benefit 
each other. If a couple goes on a vacation and enjoys it, their increase in emotional stability has 
no bearing on the emotional or even economic stability of society as a whole. This argument 
further justifies the marriage neutrality argument. 
D. Children 
Becker argues that, among other things, the main purpose of the family is "the production 
and rearing of children" (Badgett, 2001). The question of childrenis an important issue raised 
when discussing the importance of the family. Of all the discussed benefits of family formation, 
this one seems to be the only one that may have external benefits outside of the family. 
Internally, parents receive direct benefits from having children and should bear responsibility for 
their care and education (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 2006). However, externally, the nation also 
benefits when children grow up to be healthy, educated, good citizens. When properly raised 
they can be very productive adding value to the economy. Further, Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 
point out that when children are less of a burden and well cared for, the parents are not absent as 
much and have increased employment stability (2006). Therefore, benefits accrue to the parents, 
the community, employers, and the government. 
Children's outcomes across family structures are a common topic. Evidence suggests 
that children who come from families where both biological parents are present seem to do better 
than those children raised by single parents (Blau et. al. 2006). However, correlation does not 
imply causation. Therefore, many researchers still wonder to what extent family structure plays 
Gray 9 
a role in the economic and emotional support of children. However, it is arguable that any 
family structure where loving people are present and provide emotional and economic support is 
beneficial to those children. In addition Blau et. al. maintain that growing up in other family 
structures, such as single parent households, may only increase the risk of outcome failure, not 
assure it (2006). 
To sum up, this research so far has concluded that families form and are important for 
many economic reasons. Traditional family structures seem to be fading and new types of 
families are emerging. Like traditional marriage, opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitation offer 
partners companionship, affection, and love, as well as all the aforementioned benefits, 
especially the ability to share economic resources and realize economies of scale (Blau et. aI., 
2006). 
However, should the government subsidize family formation? Aside from children, we 
have seen that the benefits are mainly internal. By a man and a woman marrying, they receive 
the benefits described. However, does that make the single person next door better off? What 
about the gay couple next door? It does not. Since they get no benefits, they should not have to 
subsidize the marriage. Therefore, on efficiency grounds, the tax system should be marriage­
neutral. 
Currently marriage-neutrality is not the case in the US. Married couples enjoy 
institutional advantages, including, but not limited to, health insurance, pension rights, Social 
Security benefits, and Federal Income Tax benefits (Blau et. aI., 2006). Since these benefits do 
not extend to couples in alternative lifestyles, they face discrimination because they may pay 
higher taxes. 
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IV. Federal Income Tax 
It is necessary to analyze this marriage-neutrality argument on both efficiency and equity 
grounds. Without neutrality, the tax code provides incentives for couples to either marry or 
remain single depending on the taxes owed. Further, since we have uncovered no important 
external benefits to family formation, there is no efficiency case for treating individuals 
differently depending on their family composition. This implies that the tax code should tax the 
individual and not the family. 
Besides efficiency, equity is also important to this marriage-neutrality argument. Equity 
is the concept of fairness or justice in economics. Fairness requires vertical and horizontal equity 
among the relevant units. Vertical equity is the idea that those with greater income have a 
greater ability to pay. If those with a greater ability pay more, disproportionately, then this is 
progressivity. The US has a progressive tax structure. It is arguable that this leads to class 
warfare, but Steuerle argues that without vertical equity, you defy natural tax theory: "That is, 
some progresivity -greater contributions to the community by those who are more capable of 
contributing-is apparent in nature when the stronger or older of species support the weaker or 
younger" (C. Eugene Steuerle, 2004). Therefore, progressivity is appropriate for humans and 
our tax structure. Redistribution is necessary to pay for government and to pay for the services 
that people need. 
Horizontal equity is the idea that those with similar ability to pay taxes should pay the 
same amount. Further, it is the concept of tax neutrality or the idea that the tax system should 
not discriminate between similar things or people. Steuerle states, "Horizontal equity is the 
given of all principles affecting government policy." Economists believe that it is a principle of 
good government. With progressive rates-presumed necessary for vertical equity-marriage 
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neutrality requires that one define horizontal equity in terms of individuals, not families. In fact, 
until 1948 taxes were levied on individuals, not families. Nonetheless, in 1948 the government 
began using the traditional family as the economic unit (Rosen, 2002). Therefore, there is 
horizontal equity across families, not individuals. 
Adhering to vertical equity, horizontal equity, and marriage neutrality will lead to some 
degree of discrimination. Since the three are never met, some group(s) will always be 
discriminated. With the recent shifts in the demographics of families, culture and society's 
beliefs toward the role of the family influence the choice of tax structure. Same-sex couples are 
at a bigger disadvantage because their union is not legally recognized. On the other hand, 
opposite-sex, non-married unions could be recognized through domestic partnerships, common 
law marriage, or even through civil marriage. Therefore, the inherent structure of the Federal 
Income Tax structure is damaging the economic outcomes of families and individuals in the US. 
V. Social Security 
We have seen how the federal income tax affects all types of individuals and their 
relationship status. The principles discussed are useful in considering not only if the federal 
income tax is fair and efficient, but also to see if the Social Security system is fair and efficient. 
Social Security is a primary source of subsistence for many elderly in the US. The benefits that a 
recipient receives depend on his or her marital status. An individual can claim Social Security 
benefits based on his or her spouse's earning history. A widow/er can receive additional benefits 
upon the death ofhis or her spouse. A spouse of a disabled individual, eligible for Social 
Secu~ty, may claim additional benefits if that spouse is raising the disabled individual's child. 
Finally, a spouse who is at least 62 years old may claim additional benefits based on his or her 
spouse's disability (Dougherty, 2005). Moreover, a spouse can receive Social Security 
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retirement benefits equal to or greater than the benefits he or she is necessarily entitled to receive 
based on his or her own earnings history (Dougherty, 2005). Unfortunately, the only ones able 
to claim Social Security are the living individuals and their partners through legal marriage. 
Like the federal income tax structure, many criticisms, even more severe, exist 
concerning the Social Security system. The Social Security system also poses problems of 
equity between two groups ofpeople: one-earner married couples and all others (unmarried 
couples, single people, and same-sex couples). The biggest problem with this system is that 
payroll taxes are based on each individual's employment history, while Social Security benefits 
are based on the family (Blau et. aI., 2006). In order to receive benefits, individuals must reach 
some level of pay from jobs covered by Social Security for 10 years. Spouses of covered 
workers are entitled to receive Social Security benefits equal to 50% of the amount received by 
the covered worker, and survivor benefits of 100% if that covered worker should die, even if the 
survivor never paid payroll taxes (Blau et. aI., 2006). The current Social Security system favors 
families with a full-time homemaker over all others. As long as the husband is paying payroll 
taxes, the family receives the maximum 150% ofhis Social Security benefit. Naturally, these 
inconsistencies violate the rule ofhorizontal equity (Blau et. aI., 2006). For instance, if a wife 
works she pays in as much as she would if she were single, but only the one who earns less than 
her husband receives additional benefits over and above what she earns herself. Never married 
women, single women who never work, and divorced women, who were married less than 10 
years, receive benefits based upon their own record only. Therefore, this system affects people 
who are not married. Since same-sex couples are unable to marry, then they are truly 
disadvantaged because they cannot receive any benefits through their partners. 
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Now that we have analyzed the theory, the tax structure, and the Social Security system, 
we now look at the economic cost of the two family groupings--non-traditional and traditional-­
in light of these regulations. Since it appears that there is some inefficiency and inequality in the 
tax structure and Social Security system, I hypothesize that the tax burdens for non-traditional 
families will be much higher than traditional, married, opposite-sex couples. 
VI. Empirical Model and Data 
By focusing on the Federal Income Tax and Social Security, we can quantitatively 
illustrate how non-traditional couples are discriminated against compared to those who are 
legally married (traditional families). This research design uses simulations to test the 
differences between the two groups: legally married couples and couples who must file 
separately and singly. In addition, I use these same simulated couples to compare the different 
outcomes between the two groups via the Social Security structure. 
The research assumes that the simulated couples have no dependents (i.e. no children), 
and no itemized deductions. I assume that they take the standard deduction, as most do. Further, 
the assumed income does not include retirement savings, mortgage interest, or any other kind of 
interest or profit shares. For Social Security purposes, the assumed birthday of all couples is 
June 15, 1965 and, if they were to die, they would die on November 17,2005. The retirement 
age for full benefits is 70 years old in the year 2035. The tax year used is 2005. 
The programs used for this analysis are basic calculators found on the Internet. For the 
Federal Income Tax, I use the Internal Revenue Service's Online 2005 Withholding Calculator. 
It allows use of the basic assumptions mentioned before. To research the Social Security 
question, I use the Social Security Administration's Online Social Security Quick Calculator. To 
estimate projected earnings, the program uses an automatic-inflation adjustment. It uses 
Gray 14 
estimated future cost-of-living adjustments* (COLAs) and estimated future percentage increases 
in the national average wage increase (AWl). These estimates are derived from the 
"intermediate" assumption in the 2005 Trustees Report. This is an annual report of the Federal 
OASDI (Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) trustees. The report predicts current and 
projected financial status ofthe trust fund. The particular COLA is for December of 2005 and 
was determined in October of2005. 
To recapitulate, this research hypothesizes that traditional and non-traditional couples 
will have differences in their tax liabilities and Social Security benefits even when they have 
similar incomes. This result is because the government uses the tax codes to provide benefits for 
married couples. Since the family is the economic unit used in the US, they are taxed at different 
progressive scales than singles. Furthermore, same-sex couples and opposite-sex (non-married) 
couples, must apply as single even if they are in a committed "family" situation. 
The other aspect affecting same-sex couples is within Social Security. Since people pay 
as they go and put money toward Social Security, they build value up for retirement. If couples 
are married, then a person who has possibly never worked can claim benefits based on spousal 
earnings. Other families outside the traditional definition are denied benefits and thereby 
negatively affected by this regulation. 
VII. Results 
The following tables show Federal Income Tax and Social Security Benefit simulations 
for three types of couples with 15 sets of income assumptions. Table 1 presents the Federal 
Income Tax liabilities faced by the two comparison groups. For instance, the first line shows 
that if each partner made $12,500 dollars a year for a combined household income of $25,000 
per year, their tax liability would be $866.00 as a Non-traditional couple and $863.00 as a 
• Please see Appendix for more information about these tools and the COLA table. 
Gray 15 
Traditional couple. Their tax difference is $3.00, which is a .01 % difference in the two different 
tax liabilities. 
Table 1 
Federal Income Tax Liabilities in US 
Dollars 
Income Assumptions Comparison Groups - Tax liability Tax Differences 
Total NT-T 
Person 1 Person 2 Income Non-traditional Traditional couples % of income 
Couples filing Couples filing 
Singly Jointly 
$12,500.00 $12,500.00 $25,000.00 $866.00 $863.00 $3.00 0.01% 
5,000.00 20,000.00 25,000.00 1,409.00 863.00 546.00 2.18% 
0.00 25,000.00 25,000.00 2,159.00 863.00 1,296.00 5.18% 
25,000.00 25,000.00 50,000.00 4,318.00 4,314.00 4.00 0.01% 
20,000.00 30,000.00 50,000.00 4,318.00 4,314.00 4.00 0.01% 
0.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 7,121.00 4,314.00 2,807.00 5.61% 
37,500.00 37,500.00 75,000.00 8,068.00 8,064.00 4.00 0.01% 
25,000.00 50,000.00 75,000.00 9,280.00 8,064.00 1,216.00 1.62% 
0.00 75,000.00 75,000.00 13,371.00 8,064.00 5,307.00 7.08% 
50,000.00 50,000.00 100,000.00 14,242.00 14,236.00 6.00 0.01% 
25,000.00 75,000.00 100,000.00 15,530.00 14,236.00 1,294.00 1.29% 
0.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 20,218.00 14,236.00 5,982.00 5.98% 
70,000.00 70,000.00 140,000.00 24,242.00 24,340.00 -98.00 -0.07% 
40,000.00 100,000.00 140,000.00 24,839.00 24,340.00 499.00 0.36% 
0.00 140,000.00 140,000.00 31,411.00 24,340.00 7,071.00 5.05% 
For nearly every level of assumed incomes, non-traditional couples pay more federal 
taxes than traditional couples who are married and file jointly. I hypothesized that traditional 
couples would have fewer tax liabilities than other couples would because the two groups face a 
different tax progression that subsidizes the non-working female. However, it is interesting to 
note that the two couples are treated nearly the same when both partners in the relationship work 
and have similar income. Non-traditional couples become more disadvantaged as the income 
disparity between the two partners increases such as in the case when Person 1 has no income 
and Person 2 earns all the income. While the percent of income difference is not too high, it 
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does add up to a lot of money, especially as the couple earns more income. For instance, if 
Person 1 does not work and Person 2 makes $75,000, they pay 7% ($5,307) higher taxes than 
their legally married counterpart does. Benefit differences do not favor one grouping of incomes 
either. Both high-income and low-income couples face increased liabilities. 
It is interesting that the two comparison groups face the same tax consequences when 
both incomes are about the same. This supports the argument that the current tax structure is 
unfair and biased towards traditional household couples where the husband works and the wife 
does not. However, we found earlier that there were no external benefits to society from this 
arrangement, and that even the internal benefit due to comparative advantage seems to have 
waned. This finding has important public policy implications and should be considered by the 
government. 
Table 2 
Social Security Benefits in Year 2035* US Dollars 
Income Assumptions Comparison Groups ­ Benefit Differences 
Total Household Social Security NT-T 0/0 on 
Person 1 Person 2 Income Benefit couples income 
Non-
Traditional Traditional 
$12,500.00 $12,500.00 $25,000.00 $4,936.00 $4,936.00 $0.00 0.00% 
5,000.00 20,000.00 25,000.00 4,459.00 4,741.00 -282.00 -5.95% 
0.00 25,000.00 25,000.00 3,624.00 5,436.00 -1,812.00 -33.33% 
25,000.00 25,000.00 50,000.00 7,248.00 7,248.00 0.00 0.00% 
20,000.00 30,000.00 50,000.00 7,246.00 7,246.00 0.00 0.00% 
0.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 5,803.00 8,704.00 -2,901.00 -33.33% 
37,500.00 37,500.00 75,000.00 9,554.00 9,554.00 0.00 0.00% 
25,000.00 50,000.00 75,000.00 9,427.00 9,427.00 0.00 0.00% 
0.00 75,000.00 75,000.00 6,885.00 10,327.00 -3,442.00 -33.33% 
50,000.00 50,000.00 100,000.00 11,606.00 11,606.00 0.00 0.00% 
25,000.00 75,000.00 100,000.00 10,509.00 10,509.00 0.00 0.00% 
0.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 7,625.00 11,437.00 -3,812.00 -33.33% 
70,000.00 70,000.00 140,000.00 13,338.00 13,338.00 0.00 0.00% 
40,000.00 100,000.00 140,000.00 12,633.00 12,633.00 0.00 0.00% 
0.00 140,000.00 140,000.00 7,638.00 11,457.00 -3,819.00 -33.33% 
*Present Value of$2.80 to be received in 2035, is a roximately equivalent to $1.00 today. 
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Tables 2 and 3 show Social Security benefits and Social Security Survivor benefits, 
illustrating how the two groups are affected in their retirement years. Table 2 shows how much 
benefit the couples will receive in their retirement in 2035. Again, the dollar figures are 
inflation-adjusted for 2035. The results in Table 2 suggest that the Social Security system is 
more biased than the Federal Income Tax structure. In the cases where the first person does not 
work and does not have any Social Security earnings, slbe loses about 50% of the spouse's 
income compared to married couples. However, if both partners in both groups work and pay 
their share to Social Security and qualify, both groups generally receive the same earnings as 
would be expected. Since theory suggests that both partners likely work in non-traditional 
families, they are likely to earn Social Security benefits on their own and not likely to be too 
affected by being denied these benefits. In addition, couples are financially advised not to rely 
on Social Security and to rely on other retirement savings. Therefore, this may not affect as 
many couples. 
Table 3 shows a rather dismal outlook on one particular section of Social Security: 
survivor benefits. The dollar figures shown are the additional monthly benefit a partner would 
receive today (year 2005) ifhis or her spouse should die. For married couples, if a Social 
Security qualified spouse should die, the survivor, even one who never paid into Social Security, 
can qualify for 100% of their deceased spouse's Social Security income. Since other types of 
couples are denied marriage rights, they are unqualified for any type of survivor benefits and lose 
the entire benefit. This is detrimental for those couples that may have had one partner who never 
worked and put anything toward Social Security. Not only do these couples lose their partner 
whom they never were able to marry, they lose all their income. 
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Table 3 
Additional Social Security Survivor Benefits - Death as of 
Today * 
Income Assumptions 
Person 1 Person 2 Total Income 
$12,500.00 $12,500.00 $25,000.00 
5,000.00 20,000.00 25,000.00 
0.00 25,000.00 25,000.00 
25,000.00 25,000.00 50,000.00 
20,000.00 30,000.00 50,000.00 
0.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 
37,500.00 37,500.00 75,000.00 
25,000.00 50,000.00 75,000.00 
0.00 75,000.00 75,000.00 
50,000.00 50,000.00 100,000.00 
25,000.00 75,000.00 100,000.00 
0.00 10,000.00 100,000.00 
70,000.00 70,000.00 140,000.00 
40,000.00 100,000.00 140,000.00 
0.00 140,000.00 140,000.00 
*Figures represented in Today's Dollars 
Comparison Groups - Additional Household Soc. 
Sec. Benefit 
Non Traditional Traditional 
Add. Survivor Person 2 Person 1 benefits for Survives Survives
either Person
 
$0.00
 
0.00
 
0.00
 
0.00
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
$654.00 $654.00 
309.00 819.00 
0.00 930.00 
930.00 930.00 
819.00 1040.00 
0.00 1479.00 
1204.00 1204.00 
930.00 1479.00 
0.00 1825.00 
1479.00 1479.00 
930.00 1825.00 
0.00 2065.00 
1774.00 1774.00 
2065.00 1259.00 
0.00 2114.00 
VI. Public Policy Implications and Conclusion 
In this research, we have seen that families are important for both economic and non­
economic reasons. As alternatives to marriage or traditional families, singles adopting, opposite-
sex cohabitants and same-sex cohabitants can form economically and emotionally fruitful 
relationships. Economic benefits accrue to any grouping of people regardless of gender or any 
other social dimension. Since these benefits are largely internal, the government should design 
tax laws and regulations that are marriage-neutral. Otherwise, the economic outcome may be 
inefficient and unfair. People should be free to choose who to commit to and how to pool their 
resources without interference from government entities. 
Notwithstanding, the Federal Income tax structure and Social Security System seems to 
affect even married couples that have both partners working and making about the same amount 
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of money. Even if the government is discouraging other family formations, nontraditional 
family structures are evolving, moving away from this traditional family of a working father and 
homemaker wife to all types of groupings, including opposite-sex and same-sex relationships. 
According to Weisberg, a lag in the law exists. There have been social changes that have 
occurred in society (1976). These changes include increased female labor participation and 
growing tolerance and acceptance of opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitating couples. However, 
the tax system, Social Security System, and other legal regulations have not adapted to these 
social changes. Therefore, discrimination exists, causing friction in society across classes. 
These social changes require changes in the law. The government must take a marriage-neutral 
stance in its government policies, especially in taxation and Social Security. Marriage-neutral 
policy would not promote or discourage family formation. Horizontal and vertical equity for 
individuals achieves fair and efficient policy. Moving back to taxing the individuals of a couple 
is nothing radical. Even when non-traditional families were not prevalent, the government taxed 
individuals and not the family unit. 
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Appendix 
Tools used in this research came from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Social Security 
Administration (SSA). These are simple calculators with basic assumptions to give the user an 
approximate tax liability and projected Social Security benefits, by no means are they all-
inclusive or representative of one's true situation. The tools are at the following websites: 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/page/0..id=14806.00.html 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/calculator.html 
The following table is part of the formula for considering the estimated cost ofliving adjustment 
and for future value earnings. This data comes from the SSA website. 
Table A 
COLAs & A WI increases under the 
intermediate assumptions ofthe 2005 
Trustees Report 
Calendar COLA 
Increase 
in 
year (Percent) AWl (percent) 
2005 4.1 4.1 
2006 2.2 4.2 
2007 2.7 4.3 
2008 2.8 4.2 
2009 2.8 4.1 
2010 2.8 4 
2011 2.8 4 
2012 2.8 4.1 
2013 2.8 4 
2014 and later 2.8 3.9 a 
a Average increase. 
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